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The Rise of the Private: Shanghai’s Transforming Housing Typologies
Neeraj Bhatia
Rising tides of the private
‘On top of the sea’ is the literal translation of Shang-
hai, whose urban structure was built around thin 
canals that crossed the city. These canals, just 
like the traditional streets in Chinese culture, were 
able to move people and goods while creating a 
public arena for interaction. It was infrastructure 
– streets and canals – that formed the basis for the 
city’s morphology and the architectural typologies 
housed within it. As the rivers and streets eventually 
grew, merged, and monumentalised, they created 
separation. Thus, infrastructure, which once was 
used to collect, now divided – as is witnessed in 
the new six- (or more) lane-streets, or the Huangpu 
River, isolating Puxi from Pudong. This transforming 
notion of infrastructure is directly linked to changes 
in Shanghai’s housing typologies. The traditional 
lilong housing structure is comprised of a unit that 
multiplies through group linkages to create streets. 
In these lilong dwellings, the street and the archi-
tectural typology are one. More recently, an influx 
of high-rise apartment typologies has dislocated the 
relationship between infrastructure and building. 
Here, infrastructure is used to subdivide massive 
plots onto which built form is whimsically placed. 
The disconnection and monumentalisation of infra-
structure that corresponds to these shifting building 
typologies reveals an even deeper transformation 
of the public sphere. It is here that we witness the 
rise of the Private and the emerging loss of public 
life.
Oriental Manhattan
Shanghai is a city that has redefined the notion 
of rapid urbanisation. This new urbanisation is 
directly linked to the end of Maoism in 1978 and 
the succeeding Open Door Policy implemented 
by the Communist Party. Before the reform of the 
economic system, housing in Shanghai was consid-
erably dilapidated and in dire need of infrastructural 
improvements. Between 1949 and 1978, ownership 
was viewed as a Capitalist tendency,1 encourag-
ing few Shanghai residents to own property. The 
government, public institutions, or employers 
housed most residents. At the time, government 
investment was being poured into production rather 
than consumption, leaving little means to improve 
existing housing conditions or provide new housing. 
Furthermore, the proliferation of migrants from rural 
areas created vast increases in population with inad-
equate housing2 – between 1949 and 1965, the per 
capita living space in Shanghai declined from 3.7 to 
2.15 square meters.3 To give an idea of the magni-
tude of the dilemma – in the late 1970s, Shanghai’s 
population was five times that of London, while the 
city stood devoid of high-rise housing.4
 In April of 1984, the city was offered a renewed 
spirit of urbanisation when the government 
announced the opening of the Shanghai markets. 
Meager improvements to the city’s over-crowding, 
infrastructure, and physical appearance during the 
Maoist era left the city in disarray during the 1980s. 
Not only was housing in crisis, Shanghai as a city 
needed to remake its image to match the world-class 
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Fig. 1: New housing developments tower over the old row houses. 
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cities that it hoped to compete with. The rebuilding 
of Shanghai was part of a strategic plan to create 
a forward-looking city that eradicated most signs of 
the past while simultaneously striving to resurrect 
Shanghai’s cosmopolitan image. Former Mayor of 
Shanghai, Huang Ju, confirmed this sentiment in a 
speech that made front-page headlines:
‘Shanghai of the future must be a metropolis equal 
to New York or London,’ said Mayor Huang Ju as 
he outlined revisions to the city’s development plan 
designed to create an ‘oriental Manhattan’… He 
was addressing the City Planning Meeting, the third 
since 1949…. Marking the city government’s efforts 
to revive the past glories of Shanghai and make the 
city an international metropolis in the 21st century.’5
 The rebuilding of Shanghai into a metropolis 
occurred and is occurring at an unprecedented 
rate. The form of the new metropolis – the ‘Orien-
tal Manhattan’ – was to be comprised of endless 
towers. A symbol of progress and open-market 
capitalism, the tower typology satisfied the needs 
of Shanghai’s rapid re-urbanisation. These towers 
were deployed across the urban landscape at a 
speed that would frighten most city planners – in 
1980, a mere 11 towers between 16 and 29 storeys 
graced the skyline (and none above 30 storeys), 
while just fifteen years later the city was infiltrated 
with 811 towers between 16-29 storeys, and a 
further 53 with more than 30 storeys.6 Not only were 
towers the iconic symbol of the new Shanghai, they 
provided much needed relief to the housing crisis. 
This rapid development has been successful at 
ameliorating the living conditions that were stagnant 
during the Maoist era: more new housing was built 
in Shanghai between 1979-89 (40 million square 
metres) than between 1950-80 (23.13 million 
square meters).7 Better living conditions naturally 
implied more living space per person – which rose 
dramatically from 5.2 square metres in 1985 to 8.8 
square metres in 1997.8 Residents of demolished 
housing were relegated to either remote suburban 
areas or into tower developments that remained in 
the city. These residents make up a significant part 
of the Shanghai population – 25% of residents live 
in new housing with 1.5 million living in homes built 
between 1993-1995.9 The two forms of settlement 
that accompany this urbanisation – the tower and 
suburban dwelling – have significant ramifications 
for the public sphere. Suburban sprawl has been 
extensively documented, particularly in the North 
American context, and more importantly does not 
concern the urban condition. What is of particular 
importance here is how the urban public sphere has 
transformed with the shift from lilong housing to the 
tower. Both housing types are characteristic of their 
respective time periods and were endlessly and 
furiously implemented across the urban landscape. 
It is the dramatic supplantation of one typology by 
another that carries powerful repercussions for the 
public sphere.
De-invididualise and de-privatise
How has the public realm changed in the light of 
recent rapid development in Shanghai? I believe 
Hannah Arendt’s definition of the Public is both 
eloquently precise and offers insight into this 
discourse. According to Arendt, the public realm 
characterises a form of reality. People put forth ideas 
and thoughts into the public sphere once these are 
internally digested and ready to be presented. This 
act – of putting forth a part of oneself to be seen and 
heard – is what constitutes a form of reality. Arendt 
states, ‘Compared with the reality which comes from 
being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of 
intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts 
of the mind, the delights of the senses – lead an 
uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and 
until they are transformed, de-privatized and de-
invidualised, as it were, into a shape to fit them for 
public appearance.’10 For Arendt, the reality that 
ensues from making something public both assures 
us of the common world and ourselves. Arendt’s 
second definition of the public realm resides in the 
world that connects and simultaneously separates 
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us. She uses the metaphor of a group of strangers 
sitting around a table. For Arendt, the table is the 
public sphere – it is the world that gives us a common 
platform to understand one another, yet allows us to 
be individuals. The continual concern for the same 
object – the common world – despite the rise of 
pluralist values, is the basis for the public realm. The 
decreasing concern for the common world is directly 
related to the rise of the Private. Arendt’s definition 
of the public realm is important, for, as I shall argue, 
the transformation from the lilong to tower housing 
typology corresponds to both the rise of the Private 
as well as a loss of the arena to form reality.
Points of contact
The lilong typology that is characteristic of the ‘old’ 
Shanghai is intriguing because it presents a vivid 
public realm that is inherently attached to the typo-
logical form. Developed predominantly during the 
19th and 20th century, lilong housing is a hybrid 
between two- to three-storey row houses of Western 
tradition and the classical courtyard house.11 The 
word itself describes its housing structure – Li: 
neighbourhoods, Long: lanes – an urban typology 
that combines the street, and all its associated 
activities, within its form. The influx of population 
in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, created 
a housing shortage that favoured the notion of 
communal living. Built chiefly by the English, lilong 
are characterised by a unique hybrid of foreign 
and local influences. The notion of the row house 
was characteristically English, while the courtyard 
and allocation of public space on the street was 
largely Chinese. Initially built in 1842, lilong housing 
comprised 60% of the total dwelling area in Shang-
hai by 1949.12
 Most lilong developments consist of both commer-
cial (including service and small production) and 
housing units. The housing units are arranged into 
rows within the interior block, while the commercial 
units line the edges. Separated only by archways, 
the busy commercial street often bleeds into the 
tiny alleyways that form the neighbourhood. Each 
gateway demarcates the ends of the main lanes, 
which comprise the public circulation zone. Side-
lanes, placed perpendicular to the main lanes, 
lead to the housing units. Often dead-ends, the 
side-lanes do not instigate through-circulation and 
therefore provide a degree of privacy. This ‘fish-
bone’ circulation has a built-in mechanism for the 
subtle mediation between private, semi-private, and 
public zones. Furthermore, the mixed programs – 
commercial and housing – form diversity within the 
settlement.
 Similar to the current proliferation of apartment 
blocks, the new-type13 lilong were built at a fervent 
pace between the 1920s and 1940s to host the 
influx of population after the collapse of the Chinese 
empire in 1911. Despite the modest two- to thee-
metre lane widths, the street developed into the 
gathering zone for families and neighbours.14 In 
lilong housing developments the street becomes 
a place of gathering, conversation, debate, selling 
and movement. It alludes to many of the character-
istics Jane Jacobs felt nostalgic for during American 
modernism. Intriguingly, the street attached to the 
lilong also contains many seemingly private domes-
tic functions – kitchens, bathrooms, laundry, etc. 
These functions that normally are categorised as 
private within housing typologies are extracted and 
placed in the public realm of the street. Of course, 
this has more to do with economic constraints on the 
plebeian population, but what inadvertently ensues 
is a thriving public realm – a street programmatically 
filled with ‘private’ functions, forcing neighbours to 
intersect and interact. By presenting elements of 
privacy into the public realm, residents are forced 
to de-privatised and de-individualise even their 
most private domestic experiences.  In Arendt’s 
reading, this enables the reaffirmation of reality and 
the continual concern for the common object – the 
public realm.
 The affirmation of reality through street life 
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promotes the notion of gathering and trust. It is this 
sense of sharing that Richard Sennett so eloquently 
speaks of in Uses of Disorder15 that enables the 
breakdown of the ‘other’ in poorer populations. 
Sennett’s premise is that communities of economic 
scarcity do not have the ability to control their 
boundaries or internal composition. What results 
is tolerance and trust through the acceptance of 
diversity or the breakdown of the ‘other’. Sennett’s 
analysis goes further – he reveals that in poorer 
communities the notion of sharing such things as 
appliances or food is necessary for survival. Direct 
social interaction through sharing at these ‘contact 
points’, Sennett believes, creates a community of 
trust.
 Economic scarcity of lilong dwellers often 
accounts for contact points of interaction. A sample 
inspection of Shi-ku-men lilongs found that 56.2% 
of households had no private kitchens; 72.5% 
had no gas-supplying appliances (and depend on 
briquette stoves which are often shared); and over 
99% do not have toilet facilities.16 The sharing of 
resources unintentionally creates a sense of under-
standing and trust between neighbours. Neighbours 
are often witnessed playing mahjong or watching 
each other’s kids and stores. Moreover, shared 
street programs – kitchens, laundry, washrooms, 
etc. – create points of contact that promote under-
standing, diversity and the eradication of the ‘other’. 
Infrastructure becomes the place of gathering and 
is linked and framed by built form. The interweaving 
of social, economic and private programs – residen-
tial and commercial – creates interaction between 
different demographics and promotes street activity. 
I do not want to make the mistake of romanticising 
the lilong settlements, as there are many detrimental 
problems in their design, such as bad infrastructure 
(water supply, electricity, etc.), limited space, lack of 
privacy, and difficult access. What the lilong does 
provide, however, is a unique typology that reaffirms 
a sense of reality and place in the public realm. Jos 
Gamble’s ethnographic research on this subject is 
very telling. Through interviews with informants he 
received the following response regarding the shift 
to apartment towers:
Informants commented that although living condi-
tions in Nanshi (a lilong district) were poor, 
relationships between neighbours were good – they 
all knew each other and would help each other, for 
example, to look after the children. On one occasion, 
I visited Nanshi accompanied by a former resident 
who now lived in a high-rise flat. He felt nostalgic for 
life in Nanshi and missed the closeness of relation-
ships between neighbours and the frequent visits 
they made with each other. He contrasted this situ-
ation with his new accommodation where there was 
little or no contact with neighbours.17 
 In 1941, when Shanghai fell under the control of 
the Japanese, development of the lilong housing 
ceased. Economy and real estate slowed down 
until eventually Mao took control in 1949. During the 
Maoist era, lilong were considered non-competitive 
and inefficient in construction and delivery compared 
to modern apartment buildings.18 Furthermore, 
lilong developments were not regarded as shang, 
or nice areas, which were typically characterised by 
a lower population density, and by being more clean 
and quiet.19 The development of lilong lasted from 
1842 to 1949. In the wake of the alienation that has 
often been associated with Modernism or suburban 
sprawl, the lilong provided a unique template for the 
formation of a common public realm in architectural 
form.
Private modernisation
As Shanghai modernised and individuals were 
‘emancipated’ with more disposable wealth, a shift 
occurred in the predominant housing typology. The 
lilong were reminiscent of the ‘old’ Shanghai, riddled 
with poverty, and its associated pitfalls.  Instead, the 
new Shanghai opted for a differing typology – the 
tower. The proliferation of towers throughout the 
city, each gleaming in the utopian skies of modern-
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1978 1985 1997
Income and consumption (urban)
     Indices
             Disposable income per capita 100 160 312
              Retail Sales 100 239 2,031
     Per Capita living space (sq.m) 3.6 5.2 8.8
     Natural gas use (piped and bottled) (%) 14 22 76
     Consumer durables per 100 households
             Washing machines 6 48 89
              Refrigerators 0 7 76
              Sofas 89 132 205
              Soft beds .. 6 42
              TV, b/w 32 67 26
              TV, colour .. 17 100
    Urban telephones (in 100,000s) 28 48 554
    Long distance telephone lines (in 1,000s) 19 38 1,146
    Mobile telephones (in 1,000s) 0 0 1.323
Fig. 2: Income Consumption. (For indices 1978=100, and subsequent increases are adjusted for inflation (data not avail-
able) Source: SSB: (1998a, pp.24-5, 128, 324, 325, 327, 568, 754, 1998b, p.128, 1997a, p.537; 1996, pp.26) 
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ism, in fact realised Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin. This 
remarkable shift – essentially from the medieval city 
to modernism – now used the infrastructure of the 
street to subdivide vast plots in which the towers 
were placed. These new streets, often six or more 
lanes, were monumentalised to the point of creat-
ing separation, with each tower complex isolated 
onto its own island block. The street – the traditional 
public space in China – is now replaced with the 
park, alluding to the romantic American notion of 
arcadia. What the tower in fact did was to separate 
the public zone of the street from the architectural 
form, leading to the emergence of the Private.
 In Chinese culture, as in many traditions, the 
degree of enclosedness is associated with status. 
One need not look further than the countless enclo-
sures in the Forbidden City that advocate the power 
of the Emperor. Enclosure also has a relationship 
to chaos (luan) in Chinese beliefs, wherein walls 
and boundaries are thought to prevent luan.20 
Many of the old housing settlements in Shanghai 
are thought to be imbued with luan. The reforma-
tion of the economic structure, and its associated 
affluence, allowed for the atomisation of Chinese 
households into new ordered structures. Not only 
did families no longer need to share amenities, they 
now did not need to share any communal space. 
Furthermore, affluence allowed for the acquisi-
tion of new technologies that promulgated the 
notion of separation. Increasing sales of television 
sets and air-conditioning21 promoted the retrac-
tion of each family to their individual household. 
Even within households, increased floor space per 
person allowed for increased privacy [fig. 2]. If the 
old housing villages were infested with luan, the 
apartment tower marked a transition into a ration-
alised lifestyle. Fitted with proper plumbing, wiring, 
etc., and each a self-contained unit complete with 
kitchen, laundry and washroom, the tower did not 
require the interaction of its neighbours. Gamble’s 
ethnographic survey is revealing:
Many informants told me that people preferred the 
new high-rise housing because it was ‘one flat, 
one household’, that is, each household has its 
own kitchen and toilet. This separation reduced the 
number of arguments between neighbors; contact 
between them was now so infrequent than they 
might not even recognize each other.22
 Unlike the housing developments linked to the 
street, the stacking nature of the tower typology only 
allows for one point of gathering – the elevator. The 
disconnection of the street – infrastructure – from 
the unit means that each household is able to carry 
on in private. The parks that engulf these develop-
ments are often vast and devoid of life. Whereas 
the lilong alleyways were filled with sales activities, 
leisure, and discourse all within a small space, the 
parks at most have a few children playing or seniors 
carrying out their morning exercises. These parks 
have lost the diversity of street programs, reduced 
to either residential living or leisure – two activities 
that do not necessarily require the interaction of 
strangers. Not having to interact was a new luxury 
provided by increased wealth and a sign of the rising 
of the Private. This rise of the Private has also had 
its effects on the feeling of security and trust within 
the new developments.
 Apartment block developments are often gated, 
literally separating the park space from the adja-
cent developments. Gates are commonly viewed 
as ‘keeping people out’, whereas in this case they 
in fact ‘keep people in’. Largely rationalised as a 
mechanism for safety, despite the fact that Shang-
hai is one of the safest cities in China, if not one 
of the safest metropolises in the world. Neighbour-
hood surveillance is difficult in apartment dwellings 
as few doors face onto the street. More impor-
tantly, fewer relationships exist between neighbours 
within apartment dwellings, making neighbourhood 
surveillance difficult to carry out. What the gate in 
fact represents is the breakdown of trust. Gates are 
therefore used because of the threat of the ‘other’, 
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Fig. 3: Typical public activities that occur on the street in Lilong housing development. Photo courtesy of the author.
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the threat of the chaos outside. Intriguingly, gates 
are also used as a symbolic artifact of ownership. 
This new importance placed on the symbolisation of 
ownership brought out with the opening markets of 
1978, is nothing more than a symbolic representa-
tion of the rising power of the Private: to be Private 
was to be modern.
Cycles of destruction
So what has the rising of the private in fact done to 
the public realm and individual in China? Accord-
ing to Sennett, privatisation of the psyche creates 
a disconnection of the individual from the public 
realm.23 The more privatised the individual, the 
more difficulty they have in expressing feeling and 
in understanding the public realm. In Arendt’s terms, 
privatisation essentially dissolves the concern for 
the common platform on which the public realm 
depends. Furthermore, a loss of the public demon-
strates a decreased sense of reality. What ensues is 
often a sense of alienation and isolation that is char-
acteristic of American suburbia. It is this alienation 
that many philosophers and sociologists attribute 
to the machinery of Capitalism, and one could 
argue, began in China with the economic reform. 
Residents of apartments often describe their experi-
ence as ‘isolating’ and ‘alienating’.24  What affluence 
and shifting typologies have done is to dissolve the 
points of contact in the city. Without these points of 
contact, reality turns into alienation and trust into 
fear.
 Intriguingly, the history of China is one that could 
be described as ‘cycles of destruction’. As each 
dynasty succeeded another, time and architecture 
were often reset with a new vision. Shanghai is 
still a young city – the ground of its rapid develop-
ment is still malleable. The speed of development 
is exciting, especially when compared to stag-
nant and nostalgic American cities. The speed of 
development, however, allows little or no time for 
reflection. Within a mere twenty years, Shanghai 
has fundamentally been rebuilt. The rapid loss of 
the Public and the associated sense of Reality is 
a result of this speed. Just as Shanghai was fever-
ishly developed, it can be rebuilt again. Proposals 
for urbanisation anticipate approximately 20 million 
square metres of future development each year, 
equating to the addition of a ‘Shanghai of 1949’ 
every two years.25 The first wave of urbanisation 
addressed many pragmatic concerns for a housing 
situation that was in crisis. Now, as the crisis has 
subsided, new emphasis needs to be placed on the 
Public realm within the housing typologies. It is this 
public realm that distinguishes a city from a mere 
grouping of people.
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